One more detail I need -- which version of galaxy was your test suite run against? On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 8:59 AM, <Neil.Burdett@csiro.au> wrote:
Thanks Dannon,
The team gave this example (regarding XSS), Hope it helps
Example: open firefox, log into galaxy and paste the following URL:
152.83.54.10/capaibl/visualization/list?async=false&f-free-text-search=e&f-sharing=All&f-tags=All&f-title=All&page=1&show_item_checkboxes=false&sort=-update_time_</script><script>alert("you have been powned, right now an attacker would be stealing your cookie information")</script><img src="http://i.imgur.com/2ZTC4gh.jpg "/>
Neil
*From:* Dannon Baker [mailto:dannon.baker@gmail.com] *Sent:* Wednesday, 18 June 2014 10:55 PM *To:* Burdett, Neil (CCI, Herston - RBWH) *Cc:* Galaxy Dev *Subject:* Re: [galaxy-dev] How Galaxy prevents security attacks?
Hi Neil,
Galaxy definitely takes this sort of thing very seriously. I'll take a look at the possible XSS locations identified in the report and verify whether or not they're actually vulnerable.
For Denial of Service attacks, I'd suggest that this should be handled by the upstream proxy.
You should *always* change id_secret in your universe_wsgi.ini, but it wouldn't be affecting your XSS tests.
On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 8:48 AM, <Neil.Burdett@csiro.au> wrote:
Hi,
we'd like to host a version of Galaxy, but our security team have identified some potential areas that could be subjected to attack. I was wondering if Galaxy had mechanism in place to avoid the following issues:
*Cross site scripting*
*Description*
Cross site scripting (also referred to as XSS) is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to send malicious code (usually in the form of Javascript) to another user. Because a browser cannot know if the script should be trusted or not, it will execute the script in the user context allowing the attacker to access any cookies or session tokens retained by the browser
*Impact*
Malicious users may inject JavaScript, VBScript, ActiveX, HTML or Flash into a vulnerable application to fool a user in order to gather data from them. An attacker can steal the session cookie and take over the account, impersonating the user. It is also possible to modify the content of the page presented to the user
Affected URLS and parameters:
· */capaibl/visualization/list *
o update_time param
· */capaibl/history/delete_current*
o *purge *
· */capaibl/history/list*
o *F-deleted*
o *F-name*
· /*capaibl/user/edit_address*
o *Address_id*
o *User_id*
· */capaibl/edit_info*
o *Username*
o *User_id*
· *Capaibl/user/logout*
o *Referrer*
· */capaibl/user/manage_user_info*
o *Change_password_button*
o *Cntrller*
o *Current*
o *Email*
o *Id*
o *Message*
o *Status*
o *Username*
o *User_id*
· */capaibl/user/reset_password*
o *Message*
· */caibl/user/set_default_permissions*
o *cntrller*
*Denial of Service*
*Description of attack*
During security testing we used two different types of crawlers and both caused the system to crash. Without access to the backend it is hard to document the reason, however, an educated guess would be that there is limited memory available to sessions. When crawlers ask for multiple sessions, this could cause the webserver to allocate all its memory and crash.
*Attack scenario*
1. Open burpsuite and start the proxy function
2. Open a browser and set burpsuite as the proxy
3. Navigate to the milxcloud homepage
4. Turn on the spider function within burpsuite
The website will crash within seconds.
There is an entry in universe_wsgi.ini
# Galaxy encodes various internal values when these values will be output in
# some format (for example, in a URL or cookie). You should set a key to be
# used by the algorithm that encodes and decodes these values. It can be any
# string. If left unchanged, anyone could construct a cookie that would grant
# them access to others' sessions.
#id_secret = USING THE DEFAULT IS NOT SECURE!
Would this help address the XSS issue?
Thanks for any information
Neil
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